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Abstract— Average consensus is extensively used in distributed
networks for computing and control, where all the agents
constantly communicate with each other and update their states
in order to reach an agreement. Under the general average
consensus algorithm, information exchanged through wireless
or wired communication networks could lead to the disclosure
of sensitive and private information. In this paper, we propose
a privacy-preserving push-sum approach for directed networks
that can maintain the privacy of all agents while achieving
average consensus simultaneously. Each node decomposes its
initial state arbitrarily into two substates, the average of which
equals to the initial state, in order to guarantee the convergence to
the accurate average. Only one substate is exchanged by the node
with its neighbours over time, and the other one is kept private.
That is to say, only the exchanged substate would be visible to an
adversary, preventing the private state information from leakage.
Different from the existing state-decomposition approach which
only applies to undirected graphs, our proposed approach is
applicable to strongly connected digraphs. In addition, in direct
contrast to offset-adding based privacy-preserving push-sum
algorithm, which is vulnerable to an external eavesdropper, our
proposed approach can ensure privacy against both an honest-
but-curious node and an external eavesdropper. A numerical
simulation is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the
proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
With increasing applications in smart grids, smart buildings
and intelligent transportation systems, etc, the cooperative
distributed algorithm has been a heated research topic during
the last decade. When all the components of a network reach a
common agreement, we say that the distributed system reaches
a consensus. One of the most commonly adopted consensus
algorithm is the average consensus algorithm, where each
agent aims to reach the average of their initial values. The
convergence of average consensus is firstly proved by DeGroot
[1] and further studied by other researchers (e.g., [2], [3]).
Typical applications of average consensus include distributed
sensor fusion [4], load balancing in parallel computing [5] and
coordinated control [6].
Conventional average consensus algorithm requiring each
node to exchange their state information with the neighbouring
nodes in order to reach the average consensus, is not desirable
if the participating nodes have sensitive and private informa-
tion. In addition, by hacking into communication links, an
1X. Chen, L. Huang and L. Shi are with the Department of Electronic
and Computer Engineering, Hong Kong University of Science and Technol-
ogy, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong ( email:xchendu@connect.ust.hk,
lhuangaq@connect.ust.hk, eesling@ust.hk).
2K. Ding is with the School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798, Singapore (email:
kemi.ding@ntu.edu.sg).
3S. Dey is with the Hamilton Institute, NUI Maynooth, Maynooth,
Co. Kildare, Ireland, and also affiliated with Uppsala University. (email:
subhrakanti.dey@angstrom.uu.se).
external eavesdropper has access to state information, which
is exchanged through wireless or wired communication net-
works. As the number of privacy leakage events is increasing,
there is an urgent need to preserve privacy of each agent in
distributed systems.
Several approaches have been proposed in recent years
to protect privacy. The main idea of most existing privacy-
preserving approaches is to mask signals by adding noises.
Nozari et al. [7] proposed a differentially private consensus
algorithm by adding some uncorrelated noises. However, it
cannot converge to the exact average due to the tradeoff
between the privacy and accuracy. To improve this tradeoff,
Mo et al. [8] devised a new mechanism where exchanged
information is masked by correlated noises, and the conver-
gence to the correct average is also guaranteed. Another strand
of research emerged recently is observability-based privacy-
preserving approaches. Alaeddini et al. [9] guaranteed the
privacy protection by minimizing the information about a
certain node from the observability perspective.
None of the aforementioned approach, however, is suitable
for directed graphs with weak topological restrictions. To
preserve privacy of nodes interacting on an unbalanced graph,
Charalambous et al. [10] proposed an offset-adding privacy-
preserving approach, and Gao et al. [11] protected privacy
by adding randomness on edge weights, both of which are
only effective against honest-but-curious nodes. To improve
resilience to external eavesdroppers, Hadjicostis et al. [12] em-
ployed homomorphic encryption to maintain privacy, relying
on a trusted node. As a consequence, this approach requires a
large amount of computation and communication, which may
be inapplicable for systems with limited resources. Aiming
at protecting privacy against both honest-but-curious nodes
and eavesdroppers, Wang [13] proposed a privacy-preserving
mechanism in which the state of a node is decomposed into
two-substates. However, it is inapplicable to directed graphs
and only considers the eavesdropper which is unaware of
the entire information about the network. To summarize, the
main challenges arising in the design and analysis of privacy-
preserving average consensus algorithm are as follows:
1) Communication over directed graphs: In practice,
the information flows among sensors may not be bidi-
rectional due to the different communication ranges,
e.g., the coordinated vechicle control problem [14] and
the economic dispatch problem [15]. Owing to the
unbalanced interactions over agents, the approaches in
[7], [8] and [13] fail to achieve average consensus in
such scenarios.
2) Definition of privacy-preserving: The privacy notion
of differential privacy is not suitable for the privacy-
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preserving mechanism which is not based on noise
injection. Therefore, a new privacy notion is needed to
measure the privacy degree.
3) Existence of eavesdroppers: Different from honest-but-
curious nodes, an external eavesdropper is a stronger
adversary which has access to more information. It is
difficult to protect privacy against an external eavesdrop-
per with low computation load.
In this paper, based on the concepts introduced in [13],
we propose a state-decomposition based privacy-preserving
algorithm for directed networks that can maintain the privacy
of all agents while guaranteeing the accuracy of the average
consensus at the same time. In addition, we specify the
estimation strategy of the eavesdropper which knows more
information than [13] and provide analytical results on its
estimation performance. The main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows:
1) We propose a novel privacy-preserving push-sum algo-
rithm for strongly connected digraphs, which addresses
explicitly the constraints imposed by the topology of the
communication network (Algorithm 3). Furthermore,
using coefficients of ergodicity [16], we prove the con-
vergence of our proposed approach to the exact average
of the initial value (Theorem 1).
2) Different from the privacy notion in [10] and [12] which
only considers the exact initial value, we define the
privacy preservation against honest-but-curious nodes,
where the privacy of each node is preserved if honest-
but-curious nodes have infinite uncertainty (see Defini-
tion 4 for more details) on the initial value based on
the accessible information. Moreover, we prove that our
proposed approach can preserve privacy of each node
against honest-but-curious nodes for certain topological
conditions (Theorem 2 and Theorem 3).
3) We analyze the privacy-preserving performance of the
proposed algorithm, in the presence of an eavesdropper
(see Definition 2) and prove that the estimation error
of the eavesdropper cannot be bounded in probability
(Theorem 4). In contrast, the estimation error converges
to zero under the existing privacy-preserving approaches
in [10] and [11].
Notations: In this paper, N and Z+ represent the sets
whose components are natural numbers and positive integers.
N (µ, σ2) denotes the Gaussian distribution with mean µ and
covariance σ2. U(a, b) denotes the uniform distribution over
the interval (a, b). For an arbitrary vector x, we denote its
ith element by xi. For an arbitrary matrix M , we denote its
element in the ith row and jth column by [M ]ij . bxc denotes
the greatest integer less than or equal to x. Finally, “w.p. p”
stands for “with probability p” in this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Network Model
We consider a directed graph G , (V, E) with N nodes,
where V = {1, 2, . . . , N} denotes the node set and E ⊂ V×V
denotes the edge set, respectively. A communication link from
node i to node j is denoted by (j, i) ∈ E , indicating that node
i can send messages to node j. The self-loop is not modelled
by the directed graph in this paper, i.e., pii (which is the self-
weight of node i to be defined later in Algorithm 1) is private
to node i, ∀i ∈ V . The nodes who can directly send messages
to node i are represented as in-neighbours of node i and the
set of these nodes is denoted as N ini = {j ∈ V | (i, j) ∈ E}.
Similarly, the nodes who can directly receive messages from
node i are represented as out-neighbours of node i and the set
of these nodes is denoted as Nouti = {j ∈ V | (j, i) ∈ E}.
In this paper, we consider that the initial value of each node
is not equal to the average of them1, but each node runs the
proposed privacy-preserving push-sum algorithm (Algorithm
3) to infer their average.
Assumption 1: The digraph is assumed to be strongly con-
nected with N nodes, where N > 2. In other words, there
exists at least one directed path from any node i to any node
j in the digraph with i 6= j.
B. General Push-sum Algorithm
The push-sum algorithm, introduced originally in [17], aims
to achieve average consensus for each node communicating on
a directed graph with relatively weak topological restrictions.
Consider a network of N nodes, where each node has a private
initial state xi(0). Without loss of generality, we assume that
the initial value is a scalar. In the push-sum algorithm, each
node contains two values, xi,1(k) and xi,2(k), both of which
are updated in the same way. The algorithm is described as
follows:
Algorithm 1 General Push-sum Algorithm
Step 1. Node i ∈ V initializes xi,1(0) = xi(0) and
xi,2(0) = 1. The coupling weight between node j and node
i is denoted as pji and the self-weight of node i is denoted
as pii.
Step 2. At iteration k:
1) Node i randomly chooses a set of weights, {pji(k) ∼
U(0, 1) | j ∈ Nouti ∪ {i}}, and then normalizes them
such that
∑N
j=1 pji(k) = 1. Also, pji(k) is set to be
0 if (j, i) /∈ Nouti .
2) Node i computes pji(k)xi,1(k) and pji(k)xi,2(k), and
sends them to its out-neighbors j ∈ Nouti .
3) After receiving the information from its in-neighbors
j ∈ N ini , node i updates xi,l as follows:
xi,l(k + 1) =
∑
j∈Nini ∪{i}
pij(k)xj,l(k), l = 1, 2.
4) Node i computes the estimated average
xˆavei (k + 1) = xi,1(k + 1)/xi,2(k + 1).
It is known that the general push-sum algorithm can reach
the exact average if the network is strongly connected and
the matrix P is column-stochastic, where P = [pij ] with pij
defined in Algorithm 1 [18].
1 The probability of the event that the initial value of a node equals to
the average value of all nodes is zero if each initial value is a continuous
random variable.
C. Privacy Leakage
In this paper, we consider two types of adversaries, which
are defined as follows.
Definition 1: An honest-but-curious adversary is a node
which follows the protocol and attempts to infer the initial
value of other nodes under the knowledge of received data. In
addition, it can collude with other honest-but-curious nodes,
i.e., multiple honest-but-curious nodes can share information
with each other.
We further consider a class of eavesdroppers.
Definition 2: An eavesdropper is an external attacker who
knows the network topology and weights between every pair
of nodes. Furthermore, it can intercept all transmitted data,
and runs Algorithm 2 to estimate the initial value of each
node.
Generally speaking, an eavesdropper is more disruptive
than an honest-but-curious node since it has access to more
information. Let Ie(k) denote the information set available to
an external eavesdropper at iteration k, given by:
Ie(k) = {pij(k), pij(k)x+j,l(k) | ∀i, j ∈ V, j 6= i, l ∈ {1, 2}},
where x+j,l(k) denotes the obfuscated version of xj,l(k). With
the accumulated information, an eavesdropper can estimate
the initial value of each node by the following algorithm,
which shares a similar concept to eavesdropper estimating
algorithms for undirected graphs in [13] and [19].
Algorithm 2 Eavesdropper Estimating Algorithm
Step 1. The external eavesdropper initializes s1(0) =
x+i,1(0) and s2(0) = x
+
i,2(0).
Step 2. At iteration k:
1) The eavesdropper computes pii(k) = 1 −
∑
j 6=i
pji(k),
and updates s1(k) and s2(k) as follows:
sl(k+1) = sl(k)+x
+
i,l(k+1)−
∑
j∈Nini ∪{i}
pij(k)x
+
j,l(k),
where l ∈ {1, 2}.
2) The initial value of node i is estimated by
xˆ0i (k) = s1(k)/s2(k).
Remark 1: Algorithm 2 constructs an observer for an eaves-
dropper to estimate the initial value of node i, which mimics
the system under the general push-sum algorithm. By adopting
Algorithm 2, the eavesdropper can successfully estimate the
initial value of each node which runs the general push-
sum algorithm or existing privacy-preserving approaches in
[10] and [11] as xˆ0i (k) converges to the exact initial value
of node i. For different average consensus algorithms, the
estimation algorithms of the eavesdroppers would be different
accordingly. To the best of our knowledge, Algorithm 2 in
our paper is the first proposed algorithm that is effective for
directed graphs.
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a state-decomposition based
push-sum algorithm on directed graphs to preserve privacy
(as it has already shown in [11] that the general push-sum
algorithm leads to the leakage of privacy) and converge to the
accurate average simultaneously.
A. Privacy-preserving Push-sum Algorithm
The main idea of our approach is to let each node decom-
pose its state xi,l(k) into two substates xαi,l(k) and x
β
i,l(k),
l ∈ {1, 2}. The substate xαi,l(k) is used in the communication
with other nodes while xβi,l(k) is never shared with other nodes
except for node i itself, so the substate xβi,l(k) is imperceptible
to the neighbouring nodes of node i.
Algorithm 3 Privacy-perserving Push-sum Algorithm
Step 1. At iteration k = 0:
1) Node i ∈ V randomly generates an initial value
xαi,1(0) from U(−M,M), where M > 0 is a pre-
defined value, and initializes xβi,1(0) = 2xi(0) −
xαi,1(0), x
α
i,2(0) = 0 and x
β
i,2(0) = 2, where xi(0)
denotes the initial value of node i.
2) Node i randomly chooses a set of weights,
{pji(0), αi(0) | j ∈ Nouti ∪ {i}} from N (0,M), and
then normalizes them such that
∑N
j=1 pji(0)+αi(0) =
1. Also, pji(k) is set to be 0 if j /∈ Nouti .
Step 2. At iteration k ≥ 1:
1) Node i randomly chooses a set of weights,
{pji(k), αi(k) ∼ U(0, 1) | j ∈ Nouti ∪ {i}}, and
normalizes them such that
∑N
j=1 pji(k) + αi(k) = 1.
Also, pji(k) is set to be 0 if j /∈ Nouti .
2) Node i computes pji(k)xαi,1(k) and pji(k)x
α
i,2(k), and
sends them to its out-neighbours j ∈ Nouti .
3) After receiving the information from its in-neighbors
j ∈ N ini , node i updates its two substates xαi,l and xβi,l
as follows:
xαi,l(k + 1) =
∑
j∈Nini ∪{i}
pij(k)x
α
j,l(k) + x
β
i,l(k),
xβi,l(k + 1) = αi(k)x
α
i,l(k),
(1)
with i ∈ V , l ∈ {1, 2}.
4) Node i computes the estimated average
xˆavei (k + 1) = x
α
i,1(k + 1)/x
α
i,2(k + 1).
B. Convergence Analysis
In this subsection, we prove the convergence and accuracy
of Algorithm 3.
Under Algorithm 3, as illustrated in Fig. 1, we can view the
substate xβi,l(k), l ∈ {1, 2} as the state of a virtual node iβ
which can only communicate with the actual node i. In other
words, all substates compose a digraph G′ with 2N nodes,
and the sum of the initial values of all nodes in G′ is twice
of that in the original graph G.
Fig. 1. Virtual node iβ and corresponding weights.
Using matrix-vector notation, the iteration rule in (1) can
be rewritten as follows:{
x1(k + 1) = Pˆ (k)x1(k),
x2(k + 1) = Pˆ (k)x2(k),
(2)
where
x1(k) = [x
α
1,1(k), . . . , x
α
N,1(k), x
β
1,1(k), . . . , x
β
N,1(k)]
>,
x2(k) = [x
α
1,2(k), . . . , x
α
N,2(k), x
β
1,2(k), . . . , x
β
N,2(k)]
>,
Pˆ (k) =
[
P (k) In×n
Λ(k)n×n O
]
,
with P (k) = [pij(k)] , Λ(k) = diag(α1(k), . . . , αN (k)) (see
definitions of pij(k) and αi(k) in Algorithm 3). Then, we can
obtain {
x1(k + 1) = Pˆ (k) · · · Pˆ (1)x1(1),
x2(k + 1) = Pˆ (k) · · · Pˆ (1)x2(1).
(3)
Let Tk denote the product
Tk = Pˆ (k)Pˆ (k − 1) · · · Pˆ (1). (4)
We can easily check that matrix Tk is column-stochastic
since it is the product of column-stochastic matrices. Next,
we use the coefficient of ergodicity [16] to establish the
convergence of Algorithm 3.
Definition 3: For a column stochastic matrix Pc, the coef-
ficient of ergodicity δ(Pc) is defined as
δ(Pc) = max
j
max
i1,i2
|Pc(j, i1)− Pc(j, i2)|.
From Definition 3, it can be seen that δ(Pc) characterizes
how different two columns of Pc are; in particular, δ(Pc) = 0
if and only if the columns of Pc are identical.
Lemma 1: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. The coefficient of
ergodicity δ(Tk) converges almost surely to zero.
Proof: Define
Wt =
Nt∏
k=N(t−1)+1
Pˆ (k), ∀t ∈ Z+,
where N is the number of actual nodes in the network.
Note that there are paths from each virtual node iβ to its
corresponding actual node i and the actual nodes in V are
strongly connected. Hence, the digraph corresponding to the
matrix Pˆ (k) (diagonal excluded) has paths from all nodes to
the actual nodes for any k ∈ Z+. Furthermore, since Pˆ (k) has
positive diagonal entries at the location of the actual nodes for
any k ∈ Z+, any node i or iβ has at least one path of length
N to any actual node in V .
Thus, there is at least one row with all entries strictly
positive in Wt,∀t ∈ Z+. Let αt > 0 be the minimum value of
the entry in such a row, then we have αt ≥ N for all t ∈ Z+,
where  = mini,j∈V:pij(k)>0 pij(k).
Next, following the standard results on coefficients of ergod-
icity (see, e.g. [16], and [20]), we can obtain that if y′ = x′Wt,
then
max
i
yi −min
i
yi ≤ (1− αt)(max
i
xi −min
i
xi).
Meanwhile, for a generic column stochastic matrix Pc, we
have that if y′ = x′Pc, then maxi yi −mini yi ≤ (maxi xi −
mini xi). The forward product Tk = Pˆ (k)Pˆ (k − 1) · · · Pˆ (1)
can be assembled in blocks of length N , i.e.,
Tk =
bk/Nc∏
t=1
Wt
k∏
t=k+1−(k mod N)
Pˆ (t),
where
∏k
t=k+1 Pˆ (t) = 1. Iterating, we have that if y
′ = x′Tk,
then
max
i
yi −min
i
yi ≤
bk/Nc∏
t=1
(1− αt)(max
i
xi −min
i
xi)
≤ (1− N )bk/Nc(max
i
xi −min
i
xi).
By varying x among the vectors of the canonical basis, we
have
max
i
[Tk]ji −min
i
[Tk]ji ≤ (1− N )bk/Nc,∀j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , 2N,
i.e., δ(Tk) ≤ (1− N )bk/Nc. As k →∞, (1− N )bk/Nc → 0
happens with probability 1 and then we have δ(Tk)
a.s.−−→ 0,
which finishes the proof.
The following theorem shows that the privacy-preserving
push-sum algorithm converges to the average value of all
initial values.
Theorem 1: For a digraph satisfying Assumption 1, under
Algorithm 3, the estimated average xˆavei (k + 1) = x
α
i,1(k +
1)/xαi,2(k+1) will converge to the average of all initial values∑N
i=1 xi(0)/N with probability one. Also, x
β
i,1(k+1)/x
β
i,2(k+
1) will converge to the average with probability one.
Proof: Since Pˆ (0) is column stochastic, we have
1>x1(1) = 1>Pˆ (0)x1(0) = 1>x1(0) = 2
N∑
i=1
xi(0),
1>x2(1) = 1>Pˆ (0)x2(0) = 1>x2(0) = 2N.
Lemma 1 implies that δ(Tk)
a.s.−−→ 0, i.e., Tk tends to
have identical columns with probability one. Thus, we have
Pˆ (∞) · · · Pˆ (1) = v1>, where v = [vi] is a stochastic vector.
Therefore, the estimated average can be obtained by:
xˆavei (∞) =
xαi,1(∞)
xαi,2(∞)
=
[Pˆ (∞) · · · Pˆ (1)x1(1)]i
[Pˆ (∞) · · · Pˆ (1)x2(1)]i
=
[v1>x1(1)]i
[v1>x2(1)]i
=
vi(1
>x1(1))
vi(1>x2(1))
=
2
∑N
i=1 xi(0)
2N
=
∑N
i=1 xi(0)
N
w.p.1.
(5)
Furthermore,
xβi,1(∞)
xβi,2(∞)
=
[Pˆ (∞) · · · Pˆ (1)x1(1)]i+N
[Pˆ (∞) · · · Pˆ (1)x2(1)]i+N
=
[v1>x1(1)]i+N
[v1>x2(1)]i+N
=
vi+N (1
>x1(1))
vi+N (1>x2(1))
=
2
∑N
i=1 xi(0)
2N
=
∑N
i=1 xi(0)
N
w.p.1.
(6)
Remark 2: It is worth noting that we assume that the system
G with N nodes is expanded to the system G′ wtih 2N nodes
for the convenience of analyzing the convergence. In fact, the
number of system nodes does not change. Thus, there is no
need to build an additional communication structure under the
proposed algorithm, which is desirable if the communication
resource is limited.
C. Privacy-preserving Performance Analysis Against Honest-
but-Curious Nodes
In this subsection, we prove that Algorithm 3 protects
privacy against honest-but-curious nodes.
According to Definition 1, we consider a set of honest-but-
curious nodes A aiming to infer the initial value of node i /∈ A
based on the information accessible to it. The set of legitimate
node is denoted as L = V\A.
Under Algorithm 3, the information set accessible to the set
of honest-but-curious nodes A at time k can be defined as
IA(k) = {Ia(k) | a ∈ A}, (7)
where
Ia(k) , {xαa,l(k), xβa,l(k), pja(k), pap(k)xαp,l(k)
| p ∈ N ina , j ∈ V, l ∈ {1, 2}}.
Given time instant κ ∈ N, for any feasible information set
sequence IA(0 : κ), we define a set ∆(IA(0 : κ)) as:
∆(IA(0 : κ)) = {xi(0) : ∃xαn,1(0), xβn,1(0), pjn(k), n ∈ L,
j ∈ V, k = 0, 1, . . . , κ, s.t. IA(k) = right-hand-side of (7)
∀k = 0, 1, . . . , κ}.
The set ∆(IA(0 : κ)) includes all possible initial values of
node i that can generate IA(0 : κ) in (7). The diameter of
∆(IA(0 : κ)) is defined as
Diam(IA(0 : κ)) = sup
xi(0),xi(0)′∈ ∆(IA(0:κ))
|xi(0)− xi(0)′|.
Definition 4: The privacy of node i is preserved against
a set of honest-but-curious nodes A if, for any κ ∈
N,Diam(IA(0 : κ)) =∞ for any feasible IA(0 : κ).
Definition 4 shares a similar concept of the uncertainty-
based privacy notion in [21], which is extended from the
notion of l-diversity [22]. In l-diversity, the diversity of the
discrete-valued sensitive data is measured by the number of
different valuations for the data and a larger diversity leads to
a larger uncertainty on the sensitive data. In our problem, we
view the continuous-valued xi(0) as the sensitive data, whose
diversity is measured by the diameter the set ∆(IA(0 : κ)).
A larger diameter represents a larger diversity/uncertainty.
Note that in our problem setting, we say that the privacy is
preserved if the diameter of the set ∆(IA(0 : κ)) is infinite
for any feasible IA(0 : κ) for any κ ∈ N, achieving the largest
possible diversity. That is to say, the adversary is not able to
find a unique value or even a meaningful range of xi(0) and
it is more stringent than the privacy definition in [8] and [11]
which adopt the noise-adding approach to preserve privacy,
where it is possible that the estimated value is close to the
true initial value.
Theorem 2: For a digraph satisfying Assumption 1, the
privacy of any node i can be preserved against a set of honest-
but-curious nodes A under Algorithm 3 if there exists at least
one node m that belongs to Nouti ∪N ini but not A.
Proof: Fix any κ ∈ N and any feasible information
set IA(0 : κ). We denote {xαj,1(0)′, xβj,1(0)′, psj(k)′ | j ∈
V, s ∈ V, k = 0, 1, . . . κ} as an arbitrary set of initial substate
values and coupling weights that satisfies IA(0 : κ). Hence,
we have xi(0)′ ∈ ∆(IA(0 : κ)), where xi(0)′ = (xαi,1(0)′ +
xβi,1(0)
′)/2. We then denote xi(0)′′ as xi(0)′′ = xi(0)′ + e,
where e is an arbitrary real number.
Next we show that there exists a set of values
{xαn,1(0)′′, xβn,1(0)′′, pjn(k)′′, n ∈ L, j ∈ V, k = 0, 1, . . . , κ}
which makes xi(0)′′ ∈ ∆(IA(0 : κ)). (Note that the valuation
of the initial value of node i should still guarantee the
convergence to the original average after altering xm(0)′ to
xm(0)
′ − e, i.e., the sum of all nodes’ initial values does
not change.) The initial substate values xαi,1(0)
′′, xβi,1(0)
′′ are
denoted as follows, which satisfy xˆαi,1(0)
′′ + xˆβi,1(0)
′′ =
2xˆi(0)
′′,∀i ∈ L.
xαi,1(0)
′′ = xαi,1(0)
′, xβi,1(0)
′′ = xβi,1(0)
′ + 2e,
xαm,1(0)
′′ = xαm,1(0)
′, xβm,1(0)
′′ = xβm,1(0)
′ − 2e,
xαq,1(0)
′′ = xαq,1(0)
′, xβq,1(0)
′′ = xβq,1(0)
′,∀q ∈ L\{i,m}.
(8)
Then we divide the derivation into two situations: m ∈ N ini
and m ∈ Nouti .
Situation I: Consider m ∈ N ini , then the information set
sequence accessible to set A equals to IA(0 : κ) under the
initial substate values in (8) and the following weights:
αn(k)
′′ = αn(k)′,∀n ∈ L, k = 0, . . . , κ,
pmm(0)
′′ = (pmm(0)′xαm,1(0)
′ + 2e)/xαm,1(0)
′,
pim(0)
′′ = (pim(0)′xαm,1(0)
′ − 2e)/xαm,1(0)′,
ptm(k)
′′ = pnm(k)′,∀t ∈ {i,m}, k = 1, . . . , κ
pqm(k)
′′ = pqm(k)′,∀q ∈ L\{i,m}, k = 0, . . . , κ,
pnp(k)
′′ = pqn(k)′,∀n ∈ L,∀p ∈ L\{m}, k = 0, . . . , κ.
(9)
Situation II: Consider m ∈ Nouti , then the information set
sequence accessible to set A equals to IA(0 : κ) under the
initial substate values in (8) and the following weights:
αn(k)
′′ = αn(k)′,∀n ∈ L, k = 0, . . . , κ,
pii(0)
′′ = (pii(0)′xαi,1(0)
′ − 2e)/xαi,1(0)′,
pmi(0)
′′ = (pmi(0)′xαi,1(0)
′ + 2e)/xαi,1(0)
′,
pti(k)
′′ = pti(k)′,∀t ∈ {j,m}, k = 1, . . . , κ,
pqi(k)
′′ = pqi(k)′,∀q ∈ L\{i,m}, k = 0, . . . , κ,
pnp(k)
′′ = pnp(k)′,∀n ∈ L,∀p ∈ L\{i}, k = 0, . . . , κ.
(10)
Summarizing Situations I and II, we have that xi(0)′′ =
xi(0)
′ + e ∈ ∆(IA(0 : κ)), then
Diam(IA(0 : κ)) ≥ sup
e∈R
|xi(0)′−(xi(0)′+e)| = sup
e∈R
|e| =∞.
The above analysis holds for any κ ∈ N and any feasible
IA(0 : κ). Therefore, by Definition 4, the privacy of node i is
preserved against a set of honest-but-curious nodes A if node
i has at least one legitimate neighbor node m /∈ A.
Remark 3: The values of xαi,2(0) and x
β
i,2(0) are known to
set A since each node q initializes xαq,2(0) = 0 and xβq,2(0) =
2, ∀q ∈ V . Nevertheless, the knowledge of xαi,2(0) and xβi,2(0)
does not help the adversary to infer xi(0) since the transmitted
data pji(0)xαi,2(0), j ∈ Nouti is equal to zero under any pji(0).
Note that depending on the value of e, the weights
pmm(0)
′′, pjm(0)′′, pjj(0)′′, pmj(0)′′ in (9) and (10) could be
outside the range (0, 1). To ensure (xi(0)′+e) ∈ ∆(IA(0 : κ))
for arbitrary real number e , the weights at k = 0 should be
unrestricted, which is consistent with the weight selection in
Step 1.2) of Algorithm 3.
Theorem 3: For a digraph satisfying Assumption 1, the
initial value of any node i can be uniquely inferred in an
asymptotic sense by a set of honest-but-curious nodes A if
Nouti ∪N ini ∈ A.
Proof: Since Nouti ∪ N ini ∈ A, i.e., all the neighbors
of node i belong to set A, the following equations can be
obtained:
zl(k + 1)− zl(k)
=
∑
m∈Nini
pim(k)x
α
m,l(k)−
∑
n∈Nouti
pni(k)x
α
i,l(k), (11)
where zl(k) = xαi,l(k) + x
β
i,l(k), l ∈ {1, 2}. With the
information accessible to set A and z2(0) = 2, z2(k) can
be easily computed by:
z2(k) = z2(0)
+
k−1∑
t=0
[ ∑
m∈Nini
pim(k)x
α
m,2(k)−
∑
n∈Nouti
pni(k)x
α
i,2(k)
]
.
As k goes infinity, average consensus will be achieved
asymptotically, i.e.,
lim
k→∞
xαi,1(k)
xαi,2(k)
= lim
k→∞
xβi,1(k)
xβi,2(k)
= lim
k→∞
z1(k)
z2(k)
,
which leads to lim
k→∞
z1(k) = lim
k→∞
(z2(k)x
α
i,1(k))/(x
α
i,2(k)).
Then, z1(0) can be obtained by
z1(0) = lim
k→∞
(
z1(k)−
k−1∑
t=0
[ ∑
m∈Nini
pim(k)x
α
m,1(k)
−
∑
n∈Nouti
pni(k)x
α
i,1(k)
])
.
Therefore, xi(0) is uniquely estimated by set A in an
asymptotic sense if Nouti ∪N ini ∈ A.
Remark 4: Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 imply that the single
neighbor configuration should be avoided in order to preserve
privacy, which is also indicated in other privacy-preserving
approaches such as [11], [17] and [19].
D. Privacy-preserving Performance Analysis Against External
Eavesdroppers
In this subsection, we show that an eavesdropper defined
in Definition 2 fails to estimate the initial value of each node
when the system runs Algorithm 3.
Definition 5: The privacy of node i is preserved against an
eavesdropper defined in Definition 2 if there does not exist a
natural number k1 such that for all k > k1, |xˆ0i (k)−xi(0)| < c
for any c > 0 with probability one.
Intuitively, this means that there is no guarantee that the
estimation error will be bounded by any finite c.
Theorem 4: For a digraph satisfying Assumption 1, the
privacy of node i can be preserved by Algorithm 3 against
an external eavesdropper defined in Definition 2.
Proof: The main idea of this proof is to show that
there always exists a natural number k2 > k1, such that
|xˆ0i (k2)−xi(0)| > c for any c > 0 with a nonzero probability.
Without the knowledge of existing substates, an external
eavesdropper assumes the exchange information pij(k)xαj,l(k)
as pij(k)x+j,l(k). He then employs Algorithm 2 to estimate
the initial value of node i. The resulting estimation error is
denoted as
∣∣xˆ0i (k)− xi(0)∣∣ = |(aβk + γk)/(2− βk) |, where
βk = αi(k − 1)xαi,2(k − 1), γk = x¯αi(k − 1)xαi,2(k − 1) −
αi(k− 1)xαi,1(k− 1), x¯ =
∑N
i=1 xi(0)/N and a = xi(0)− x¯.
Without loss of generality, we assume a > 0. Otherwise one
can replace a and γk by −a and −γk, respectively, and follow
the same analysis hereinafter.
(1) From the convergence analysis in equation (5), we have
lim
k→∞
αi(k − 1)xαi,1(k − 1)
αi(k − 1)xαi,2(k − 1)
= x¯,
i.e., lim
k→∞
γk = 0. Hence, there exists a natural number k3
such that for all k > k3, |γk| < a. Then for any k > k3, we
have
|xˆ0i (k)− xi(0)| > |(aβk − a)/(2− βk)| . (12)
Therefore, for all k > k3,
P r
(
|xˆ0i (k2)−xi(0)| > c
)
> Pr
(
|(aβk − a)/(2− βk)| > c
)
.
(2) If βk ∈ (2− δ1, 2− δ2), where 0 < δ2 < δ1 ≤ ac+a ,
we can obtain
|(aβk − a)/(2− βk)| > c.
Then Pr
(
|(aβk − a)/(2− βk)| > c
)
> Pr
(
βk ∈ (2 −
δ1, 2− δ2)
)
.
(3) Next we will prove
Pr
(
xαi,2(k − 1) ≥ 2− δ2
)
> 0 (13)
for any k > 1 by induction.
From the system dynamics in Algorithm 3, we have
xαi,2(1) = 2 and x
α
i,2(2) = 2
∑
j∈Nini pij(1). Since pij(1) ∈
(0, 1) for any j ∈ N ini , one has Pr
(∑
j∈Nini pij(1) ≥
(2− δ2)/2
)
> 0. Hence, (13) holds when k = 2 and k = 3.
Assuming that (13) holds when k = t and k = t+1, we have
xαi,2(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈Nini ∪{i}
pij(t)x
α
j,2(t) +αi(t− 1)xαi,2(t− 1) ≥
(2− δ2)(pii(t) + αi(t− 1)) with a nonzero probability.
Since pii(t) and αi(t − 1) are i.i.d. random variables over
the range (0, 1), one has Pr((pii(t) + αi(t − 1)) ≥ 1) > 0.
Hence, Pr
(
xαi,2(k − 1) ≥ 2− δ2
)
> 0 holds for k = t+ 2.
By induction, Pr
(
xαi,1(k− 1) ≥ 2− δ2
)
> 0 holds for any
k > 1.
(4) Since αi(k − 1) ∈ (0, 1) and Pr
(
xαi,2(k − 1) ≥ 2 −
δ2
)
> 0 for any k > 1, there always exists a natural number
k2 > max{k1, k3} such that
Pr
(
αi(k2 − 1) ∈
( 2− δ1
xαi,2(k2 − 1)
,
2− δ2
xαi,2(k2 − 1)
))
> 0, (14)
i.e., Pr
(
βk2 ∈ (2− δ1, 2− δ2)
)
> 0.
Therefore,
Pr
(
|xˆ0i (k2)− xi(0)| > c
)
> Pr
(
|(aβk2 − a)/(2− βk2)| > c
)
> Pr
(
βk2 ∈ (2− δ1, 2− δ2)
)
> 0,
i.e., the privacy of node i is preserved against an eavesdropper
which runs Algorithm 2.
IV. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we illustrate the effectiveness of our pro-
posed algorithm and show its advantages over existing privacy-
preserving approaches on directed graphs.
Fig. 2. A strongly connected digraph of 5 nodes.
We first verify the convergence performance of our proposed
algorithm communicating on a strongly connected digraph
with N = 5 nodes, shown in Fig.2. The initial values for all
nodes are chosen from U(0, 50), c is set to be 500 and M is set
to be 100. The evolution of the network and the convergence
of xˆavei are shown in Fig. 3. It is shown that the convergence
is achieved, which is consistent with the theoretical results.
Moreover, Fig. 4 shows that the estimation error cannot be
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Fig. 3. The evolution of the estimated average obtained by the agents under
Algorithm 3.
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Fig. 4. The evolution of the absolute value of the error between the estimated
xˆ05(k) and the true initial value x5(0) under Algorithm 2.
always bounded by c, i.e., the privacy of node 5 is preserved
against an external eavesdropper.
Unlike the privacy-preserving approach in [10] and [11],
where the convergence only happens after k = L + 1 (L
is an randomly chosen integer), our proposed approach starts
converging to the average at the iteration k = 1. Fig. 5 shows
the evolution of mean square error (MSE) under different
privacy-preserving approaches, where L is set to be 10.
According to Fig. 5, our proposed approach converges faster
than others and the MSE is much smaller before k ≤ L.
Next, we investigate the privacy-preserving performance of
our proposed approach. Without loss of generality, we assume
that an eavesdropper is interested in the initial value of node
5 and applies Algorithm 2 to estimate it.
Fig. 6 shows that the evolution of estimated average and the
eavesdropper’s estimated value under the privacy-preserving
approach in [10]. It can be seen that as the network converges
and the estimated average value reaches the true average value,
the eavesdropper’s estimated value also converges to the initial
value of node 5. Similar results can be obtained using the
random-weight approach in [11]. Therefore, the error between
xˆ5(0) and x5(0) is bounded, i.e., the privacy of node 5 cannot
be preserved against an eavesdropper in [10] and [11].
It can be seen in Table I that, besides homomorphic en-
cryption [12], our proposed algorithm can be effective in a
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Fig. 5. The evolution of MSE under different privacy-preserving approaches.
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Fig. 6. Eavesdropper can estimate the initial state of node 5 under the
privacy-preserving in [10] by applying Algorithm 2.
number of situations. Furthermore, our proposed algorithm is
built on the simple multiplications and addition steps (can be
computed in O(1) time). By comparison, the implementation
of [12] requires extra cryptosystems to perform complicated
modular exponentiation steps (see [23] for more details about
its computation and time complexity). Hence, in contrast to
privacy-preserving approach in [12], our proposed algorithm
covers a wider range of applications.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a privacy-preserving push-sum
algorithm based on state decomposition for systems interacting
on directed graphs. While protecting privacy from honest-but-
curious nodes, our approach can guarantee the convergence
to exact average. Moreover, in contrast to the offset-adding
or random-weight approach, our proposed approach can
prevent an external eavesdropper from estimating the initial
value of each node. Furthermore, our proposed algorithm
has lower computation and communication complexity which
can be easily implemented in practice. Future work includes
analyzing the convergence rate of the privacy-preserving
push-sum algorithm and studying other types of consensus
problems.
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